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Abstract
This paper generalizes a result by Samet concerning iterated expecta-
tions and common priors. When a player in some state of the world is
allowed to ascribe probability zero to that state, something not allowed
in Samet’s framework, iterated expectations may not converge, and when
they do, common knowledge of their limit may not characterize a common
prior. It is shown here that replacing common knowledge with common
belief, convergence is still lost in general, but when it obtains, the full
characterization is restored.
1 Introduction
In interactive contexts where a player forms diﬀerent expectations about random
variables at diﬀerent states of the world, her beliefs are themselves random
variables. For a given random variable, we are thus naturally led to analyze
a player’s inﬁnite hierarchy of expectations of random variables, expectations
of other players’ expectations of random variables, and so on. Samet (1998)
uses the Markovian structure of type functions to characterize existence and
uniqueness of a common prior, and when a unique common prior exists, to
meaningfully construct it in terms of players’ expectations only. The main
results in Samet (1998) are as follows: ﬁrst, if for a given random variable and
a given sequence of players i1;i2;::: where each player appears inﬁnitely often
we could compute, at each state, i1’s expectation of it, i2’s expectation of i1’s
expectation of it, and so on, then we would end up with a number whose value
is common knowledge among the players in every state. Second, there is a
common prior if and only if, for every random variable, the limit is the same
regardless of what sequence of players we choose.
These results hold under the assumption that every player, at every state,
must assign positive probability to that state. While this is not a very restrictive
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1assumption, it is interesting to investigate the eﬀects of relaxing it, and this is
what this work does. In Samet (1998) it is suggested that analogous results are
true once we replace the notion of common knowledge with that of common
1-belief (as deﬁned by Monderer and Samet (1989)). Our results show that
the second result indeed holds in our more general framework, while the ﬁrst
one (in particular, convergence of iterated expectations to values which are
common knowledge at every state, even if a common prior doesn’t exist) cannot
be proved.
2 Common Beliefs and Common Priors
We take as given a type space hI;Ω;(Πi;ti)i2Ii, where I = f1;:::;Ig is a ﬁnite
set of players; Ω is a ﬁnite set whose elements we call states and whose subsets
we call events; Πi is player i’s information partition, a partition of Ω whose
unique element containing ! we denote by Πi(!); ti is player i’s type function:
for each ! 2 Ω, ti(!)(¢) is a probability measure on (Ω;2Ω) satisfying
ti(!)(Πi(!)) = 1 8 ! 2 Ω; (1)
ti(!)(¢) = ti(!0)(¢) 8 !;!0 2 Ω s.t. !0 2 Πi(!): (2)
An event E is common knowledge1 at ! if it includes an event which contains
! and is a union of elements of Πi for every i. An event E is evident 1-belief if
ti(!)(E) = 1 for every i 2 I and every ! 2 E. Finally, an event E is common
1-belief at ! if there exists an evident 1-belief event F such that ! 2 F and
ti(!0)(E) = 1 for every i 2 I and every !0 2 F.
We denote by B the set of nonempty minimal evident 1-belief events. These
are thus the nonempty minimal events B which are commonly 1-believed at
every ! 2 B. These events are disjoint. In fact, if B;C 2 B and B \ C 6= ?,
then ti(!)(B) = ti(!)(C) = 1, hence ti(!)(B \ C) = 1 for every ! 2 B \ C,
hence by minimality of B and C, B = C. It follows that Ω can be uniquely
partitioned as
(3) Ω = B1 [ ¢¢¢ [ Bk [ N;
for some ﬁnite number k, where B1;:::;Bk 2 B and N is such that ti(!)(N) = 0
for every i 2 I, B 2 B, ! 2 B. Note that N can’t contain any evident 1-belief
event.
A probability measure p on Ω is a common prior, provided
p(Πi(!))ti(!)(E) = p(E \ Πi(!)) (4)
for all i 2 I, E ½ Ω and ! 2 Ω. Similarly, for B 2 B, a probability measure pB
on B is a common prior on B if for all i 2 I, E ½ Ω and ! 2 B,
pB(B \ E \ Πi(!)) = pB(B \ Πi(!))ti(!)(B \ E): (5)
1The notion of common knowledge is only used in section 3.1.
2Lemma 1. If p is a common prior, then p(N) = 0.
Proof. Suppose S := f! 2 N j p(!) > 0g is nonempty, and let ! 2 S and i 2 I.
By (4) and (2) above, ti(!0)(!) > 0 for each !0 2 Πi(!). But, by (3) and by
deﬁnition of B, for every B 2 B and every !0 2 B we have ti(!0)(!) = 0, because
! 2 N. It follows that Πi(!)\B = ? and thus, again by (3), Πi(!) ½ N, which
implies by (1) that ti(!)(S) = 1. But this is true for every i 2 I, meaning that
S is evident 1-belief, a contradiction. ¥
Lemma 2. If pB is a common prior on B 2 B, then pB(!) > 0 for each ! 2 B.
Proof. Call S the support of pB. Then, by (5), pB(S \Πi(!)) = pB(B\Πi(!)),
hence ti(!)(S) = 1, for every i 2 I and every ! 2 S. In other words, S is a
nonempty, evident 1-belief event which is contained in B, and since B is minimal
for this property, we conclude that B = S. ¥
Proposition 1. The set of common priors is the convex hull of the set of
common priors on the elements of B.
Proof. Suppose pB is a common prior on B 2 B, and deﬁne the probability
measure p on Ω as p(E) = pB(B\E) for every event E. If ! 2 B we see that (4)
is obviously satisﬁed. The same is clearly true if ! = 2 B and pB(B \Πi(!)) = 0.
Finally, if ! = 2 B but pB(B\Πi(!)) > 0, then there exists !0 2 B\Πi(!); since
!0 2 B, (4) holds for !0, and since Πi(!) = Πi(!0), hence ti(!)(E) = ti(!0)(E),
(4) also holds for !.
Conversely, suppose p is a common prior. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists
B 2 B such that p(B) > 0. Let ! 2 B and !0 2 Πi(!). Since B is evident
1-belief, p(!0) > 0 clearly implies !0 2 B, hence we see that p(B \ Πi(!)) =
p(Πi(!)). In other words, the probability measure pB on B deﬁned by pB(E \
B) = p(E \ B)=p(B) for every event E satisﬁes (5).
¥
From now on we assume that Ω = B [ N, i.e. we assume that B contains
only one element. Proposition 1 ensures this is meaningful, and together with
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it implies that the support of any common prior must
be exactly B. But, as Samet (1998) notes, deﬁning for every player i 2 I the
stochastic matrix Mi as Mi(!;!0) = ti(!)(!0) for every !;!0 2 Ω, a probability
measure p on Ω is a common prior if and only if it is a stationary probability
measure of Mi, that is pMi = p, for every i 2 I. We conclude by Lemma 2 that,
whenever a common prior exists, B is an ergodic set of states for each Markov
chain Mi, hence in particular that the common prior is unique.
3 Iterated Expectations
For a random variable f : Ω ! R and an inﬁnite sequence i1;i2;::: in I where
each player appears inﬁnitely often, the corresponding iterated expectation is
the sequence of random variables Mi1f;Mi2Mi1f;:::.
33.1 Divergent Expectations and Common Knowledge
In our framework, the main result in Samet (1998), which enables a full char-
acterization of existence and uniqueness of a common prior, and a meaningful
construction of it (when it uniquely exists) in terms of players’ beliefs, need not
hold even in simple cases. As an example, let I = f1;2g, Ω = f!1;!2;!3g,
Π1 = ff!1;!2g;f!3gg and Π2 = ff!1g;f!2;!3gg, and let the type functions of
















The only event which is common knowledge at any state is Ω itself. However,
despite the existence of many common priors (any convex combination of [1 0 0]
and [0 0 1]), for a random variable f = [f1 f2 f3] such that f1 6= f3 we see that
no iterated expectation of it can converge to a value which is common knowledge
at any state, because it takes both values M1f and M2f inﬁnitely often, and
the two are diﬀerent since f1 6= f3.
3.2 Divergent Expectations and Common 1-Belief
As a preliminary result (which is important in its own right) Samet (1998)
proves that, under the assumption that ti(!)(!) > 0 for every i 2 I, ! 2 Ω,
every iterated expectation converges to a value which is common knowledge in
every state. Here an analogous claim, in terms of common 1-belief, fails to be
true, as the following example shows.
Let I = f1;2;3g, Ω = f!1;!2;!3;!4g, Π1 = ff!1;!2g;f!3;!4gg and Π2 =
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Note that B = fΩg. Since M2M1 = M2 and M1M2 = M1M3M2M1 = M1,
given a random variable f = [f1 f2 f3 f4] (taken as a column vector) we see
that the iterated expectation
M1f; M2M1f; M3M2M1f; M1M3M2M1f; :::
doesn’t converge, because it takes both values M1f and M2f inﬁnitely often.
And since B = fΩg, in no state it is common 1-belief that the iterated expecta-
tion converges.
43.3 Convergent Expectations
The second result in Samet (1998), according to which a common prior exists
if and only if, for every random variable, every iterated expectation converges
to the same value, and this value is common knowledge, can be proved here
once we replace common knowledge with common 1-belief (with convergence
obtaining almost surely with respect to the common prior).
As said earlier, there’s no loss of generality in assuming ti(!)(!) > 0 for all
! 2 B and all i 2 I, since we already proved that otherwise a common prior
doesn’t exist. On the other hand this is all we need to prove our main result.
Theorem 1. There uniquely exists a common prior p if and only if, for every
random variable f, it is common 1-belief at B that every iterated expectation of
f converges to pf.
Proof. Let ¾ be a permutation of I. The restriction of the Markov chain
M¾(1) ¢¢¢M¾(I) to B is ergodic, so suﬃciency follows immediately from Theo-
rem 1’ in Samet (1998). Conversely, suppose p is a common prior. Then, by
Proposition 1, the restriction of p to B is the unique common prior on B, and
convergence follows immediately by Theorem 1 in Samet (1998). ¥
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